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U.S. Supreme Courts 1989 Civil Rights and
Employment Cases: A Defense Perspective
Laurie Zenner*
Recent rulings of the United States Supreme Court in the ar-
eas of civil rights and employment litigation in the 1989 session
have caused a flurry of media attention and consternation among
civil rights groups. Efforts have been made in Congress to remedy
the effects of these decisions, which many groups say mark the be-
ginning of the end of progress towards equal opportunities for mi-
norities and women which has occurred since the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.
It is indisputable that the 1989 term decisions of the Supreme
Court will have an impact on plaintiffs in class action suits. From
the perspective of defending these types of suits, however, the im-
pact of the decisions is far less pronounced. When asked the ques-
tion, "What will change in the way you handle discrimination suits
in the aftermath of the 1989 decisions?", the short answer is: not
much.
That is not to say, of course, that those defending civil rights
suits and Title VII actions will not find comfort in the Supreme
Court's decisions. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the defense
will be handling these suits in the future in very much the same
way it handled them before. Indeed, despite all the rhetoric, I
would venture to guess that the way employers behave with re-
spect to their employees will be unchanged in the aftermath of
these decisions with the possible exception that employers may be
more careful in making subjective evaluations of their employees
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.'
The Supreme Court's decisions in the 1989 term and Watson
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v. Fort Worth State Bank and Trust, 2 which. was decided in 1988,
mark a change in the Supreme Court's view of civil rights and em-
ployment discrimination cases. It can be argued, however, that the
limitations placed upon discrimination actions by the Supreme
Court simply lessen the number of remedies available to civil
rights plaintiffs and do not lower the quality of the remedies.
Even under the Court's most recent decisions, plaintiffs will still
win the 'good' cases. The bad and weak cases, however, may be
thrown out of court before trial, which in the end is a service to us
all.
Perhaps the recent employment discrimination decision of
the Supreme Court that has received the most criticism is Wards
Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio.3 The Wards Cove decision
is an excellent example of how, although the law may have
changed, the handling of the defense by defense lawyers will not
be substantially effected by the decision.
Wards Cove involved a class of non-white cannery workers
alleging that they were denied employment as higher paid, non-
cannery workers due to the employer's discriminatory hiring and
promotion practices. 4 As proof of the disparate impact of the em-
ployer's hiring practices, plaintiffs offered statistics which showed
that a much higher percentage of minority job applicants were
hired for unskilled cannery jobs, than for skilled positions.5 The
plaintiffs proceeded on the "disparate impact" theory, which does
not require evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discrim-
inate.6 In disparate impact cases, the plaintiff must show that a
facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected class.
The employer is then permitted to come forward with evidence
supporting its practice.7
The Supreme Court changed the law in Wards Cove. The
Court held that when using statistics to create a prima facie case
of disparate impact, a plaintiff must focus on comparing selected
applicants with the qualified labor population. 8 The plaintiffs in
Wards Cove simply compared the number of minorities in un-
skilled cannery jobs with the number of minorities in skilled
positions.9
2. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
3. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
4. Id, at 2120.
5. Id, at 2121.
6. Id. at 2120.
7. d
8. Id. at 2121.
9. Id. at 2121-122.
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Courts in the past held that plaintiffs who relied on statistics
showing a relatively small percentage of protected workers in
skilled positions versus a large number of protected workers in un-
skilled positions satisfied a prima facie case of disparate impact.
In contrast, however, defense lawyers frequently argued that the
relevant comparison was, as the Court in Wards Cove held, a com-
parison with the relevant labor market. Defense lawyers argued
that an employer can only discriminate against a protected class if
members of the protected class are available for positions and are
denied those positions. For example, it is impossible for an em-
ployer to discriminate against a class of protected persons if no
protected persons are available to hold those positions. As the
Supreme Court stated, "If the absence of minorities holding such
skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified non-white appli-
cants (for reasons that are not petitioner's fault), petitioner's selec-
tion methods or employment practices cannot be said to have a
'disparate impact' on non-whites."'1
In addition to tightly defining proper statistical analyses, the
Court restricted what constitutes "causation" in a disparate impact
case." Even if a proper statistical analysis is used to show that
there is a racial imbalance in the workforce, plaintiffs now have
the further burden of showing that the imbalances are caused by
an isolated, particular hiring practice.12 This showing is now part
of a plaintiff's prima facie case. In so stating the Court relied on
its decision a year earlier in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust.'3
In Wards Cove, the respondents alleged that several "objec-
tive" employment practices (e.g., nepotism, separate hiring chan-
nels, rehire preferences, as well as the use of subjective decision-
making) used to select non-cannery workers had a disparate im-
pact on non-whites.14 The Court held that in order to succeed in
proving a prima facie case of disparate impact, plaintiffs must
show that
the disparity they complain of is the result of one or more of
the employment practices they are attacking here, specifically
showing that each challenged practice has a significantly dispa-
rate impact on employment opportunities for whites and non-
whites. To hold otherwise would result in employers being po-
tentially liable for the myriad of innocent causes that may lead
to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
10. I& at 2122.
11. Id. at 2124.
12. Id,
13. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
14. 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
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forces.15
These changes will not significantly change the way defend-
ants defend employment discrimination cases. Employers have al-
ways argued that a plaintiff must show which of its particular
practices has caused the discrimination, even in a disparate impact
case, and cannot simply dump statistics of racial or gender imbal-
ance in the workforce on the defendant and claim that "some-
thing" must have caused it, and that "something" must be
inherently discriminatory.
The Court in Wards Cove also altered the burden that the
defendant must meet once the plaintiff has made out a prima fa-
cie case of disparate impact. Under the old proof burden outlined
in Griggs v. Dukes Power Co. ,16 if plaintiffs established a prima fa-
cie case of disparate impact, the focus shifted to the employer to
show a business justification for the use of the attacked employ-
ment practices.1 7 In the past, federal courts found that if a prima
facie case was established, the employer had the burden of prov-
ing that the employment practice was required by business as a ne-
cessity. In Wards Cove, however, the Supreme Court explained
that the employer does not have the burden of proving business
necessity, but only carries the burden of producing evidence of a
business justification for the employment practice. The burden of
persuasion, the Court held, remains with the disparate impact
plaintiff.ls
The Wards Cove Court held that were the challenged prac-
tice required to be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's
business for it to pass muster, the degree of scrutiny would be al-
most impossible for most employers to withstand.19 Again citing
Watson, the Wards Cove Court states that "the ultimate burden of
proving that discrimination against a protected group has been
caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plain-
tiff at all times."20 The Court acknowledged that "some of our
earlier decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise,"21 but it
claims those rulings were limited to a burden of production, not
persuasion.22 In addition, if the plaintiff cannot overcome the busi-
ness necessity defense, it may still be able to prevail by showing
15. Id.
16. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17. Id, at 132.
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that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesir-
able racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate inter-
est."23 The Court noted that those alternative practices put fort by
the plaintiff must be "equally effective" as petitioner's chosen hir-
ing procedure in achieving petitioner's legitimate employment
goals. 24
The area of business justification may be the only facet of the
Wards Cove decision that changes how the defendant may ap-
proach the case. Obviously, if the defendant does not carry the
burden of proof at all in the disparate impact case, the defendant
may be more conservative in the proof that it offers to rebut the
plaintiff's case. As a practical matter, however, in most of the law-
suits that are tried the defendant will do everything it can to prove
that the employment practices that it uses are necessary and legiti-
mate. Nothing in Wards Cove will change that way of defending
claims.
Two other recent decisions are also illustrative of the fact
that these changes will have very little practical effect on how law-
yers and defense counsel handle employment discrimination cases.
In Lorence v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. ,25 the Court resolved a split
among the courts of appeals by holding that the date of the signing
of a collective bargaining agreement triggers the statute of limita-
tions for discrimination complaints rather than the time when the
employer felt the "concrete effects" of the system contained in the
collective bargaining agreement.26 The Court, contrary to the posi-
tion of the Justice Department and the EEOC, ruled that a civil
rights challenge to a seniority plan must be filed within 300 days of
the plan's adoption. In this case, the lawsuit was filed by three fe-
male employees within 300 days after the employees were de-
moted, pursuant to the seniority plan, but three years after the
seniority plan was adopted.27
Commentators have suggested that the Lorence decision
reverses the trend in the "continuing violation" line of cases,
under which a plaintiff could wait years before challenging em-
ployment practices and then claim that the violation was continu-
ing until the present. Now, at least in the field of bona fide
seniority systems, employers that institute seniority systems or
change systems that are already in place can expect that any chal-
lenges will be made within a reasonable time frame after the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2127.
25. 109 S. Ct. 2061 (1989).
26. Id at 2261.
27. Id. at 2264.
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changes are introduced. As a practical matter, employers will still
make changes in their seniority systems the way they always have.
The defense of the case will rest with whether the plaintiff has
proven an actual intent to discriminate on statutorily prescribed
grounds on the part of those who negotiated or maintained that
seniority system. The only change will be that plaintiffs cannot
bring cases many years after the change in the seniority system
has taken place.
Similarly, the change in law set forth in Martin v. Wilks,28 is
significant not so much for the defense of civil rights cases and em-
ployment cases, but for its procedural effects. In Martin, white
Birmingham, Alabama firefighters sued the city, alleging that be-
cause of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of
less qualified blacks. The firefighters argued that the defendant's
decisions were made on the basis of race and on reliance of a con-
sent decree entered in a proceeding in which plaintiffs were not
parties. The Supreme Court decided that the white firefighters
were not precluded from challenging the employment decisions
made pursuant to a consent decree, as the white firefighters were
not parties to the lawsuit in which the decree had been entered.29
While Martin certainly signals the conservative stance the
Court takes in the affirmative action cases, it does not eliminate
the importance of affirmative action programs. The real impact of
this decision is to make proceedings to obtain consent decrees
more complex for both plaintiffs and employers. To ensure that
consent decrees are not collaterally attacked, parties must join all
possibly effected employees to the initial lawsuit, making the liti-
gation more time consuming and expensive for all concerned. Old
cases resolved by consent decrees may be reopened as well. The
net result of Martin does not change an employer's underlying af-
firmative action responsibilities, but gives all employees a day in
court when affirmative action obligations come under attack.
In the past when settling discrimination lawsuits on behalf of
employers, we rejected the use of consent decrees for much the
same reasons that underly the Court's opinion in Martin v.
Wilkes. It has long been the belief of defense attorneys that those
consent decrees were not only a "can of worms" for an employer,
but could be collaterally attacked by those not a party to the con-
sent decree. Thus, even if an employer were extremely willing to
accommodate a protected class by the use of goals, those goals
were often difficult and expensive to implement and the class
28. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
29. Id. at 2180.
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might be better served by other relief. That has been my advice to
clients with respect to consent decrees. In addition, defense coun-
sel have always suspected that consent decrees may be subject to a
collateral attack by non-class members, either those in other pro-
tected classes or by whites. Thus, neither the class settling with
the employer nor the employer can gain any comfort from the im-
position of a consent decree when, again, the class may be better
served by other relief.
Another Supreme Court decision decided last June which re-
ceived considerable attention was Patterson v. McCean Credit
Union,30 a lawsuit by a black teller against her employer. In Pat-
terson, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 in employment discrimination lawsuits.31 Section
1981 is a civil rights statute passed in the reconstruction era which
prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 1981 prohib-
its racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
contracts.32 Thus, the Patterson decision applies to private em-
ployers as well as the United States government. However, the
Court narrowly defined Section 1981 lawsuits. The Court ruled
that Section 1981 could only be used for hiring and failure to pro-
mote claims, and then only where the promotion would result in a
"new and distinct relationship between employee and employer."33
Section 1981 lawsuits could not be brought because of racial har-
assment or other working conditions.34 Thus, the black plaintiff in
Patterson who allegedly was the target of racial slurs by a supervi-
sor, could not sue for these remarks under Section 1981. 35
The Court based its interpretation upon a distinction between
the language of Section 1981, which refers to the ability to "make
and enforce contracts," and "post-formation conduct" which deals
with the performance of an already-established contractual obliga-
tion. It found that conditions of continuing employment were
post-formation conduct which did not implicate the protections of
Section 1981.36 The Court also relied upon the expansive reach of
Title VII in its decision to narrowly construe matters actionable
under Section 1981, noting that this opinion served to "preserve
the integrity of Title VII procedures without sacrificing any signifi-
30. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
31. Id. at 2363.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2365.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2367.
36. Id. at 2372-73.
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cant coverage of the civil rights laws."3 7
Because of the extensive coverage of Title VII and state
human rights acts, this decision has little impact on employers.
The racial harassment claims the Court dismissed as not actionable
under Section 1981 would certainly have been actionable under the
terms of Title VII. Indeed, the practical impact of the decision is
to force plaintiffs to follow the procedural requirements of Title
VII in disputes over conditions of employment and work environ-
ment. In addition, the decision limits the types of damages that
are available to a plaintiff in these cases, since Section 1981 is a
tort statute which provides for tort remedies and Title VII dam-
ages are limited to wage loss.
Since Section 1981 is a civil rights statute, it is limited in
scope to racial minorities. It does not apply to women. Thus, the
decision in Patterson can be construed as an attempt by the
Supreme Court to bring the laws regarding racial and sexual dis-
crimination into conformity via Title VII. Prior to the Patterson
decision and other like decisions which limit the scope of 1981 ac-
tions, multiple remedies to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs routinely brought
claims under Section 1981, Title VII, state human rights acts, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. When coupled these
causes of action were with state tort causes of action which have
become so popular in recent years, the number of counts contained
in most employment law cases, even individual cases, is in the
double digits.
Title VII was designed to remedy discrimination in the em-
ployment context. Thus, an argument can be made that it should
be the sole federal remedy for the alleviation of discrimination in
the workplace. The fact that Section 1981, unlike Title VII, allows
for tort damages should not serve to maintain a system in which a
plaintiff has multiple theories of recovery. Congress apparently
did not intend discrimination in the workplace to be considered a
tort. One or two laws at most that apply to discrimination would
let employers know where they stand and give employees a rela-
tively simple vehicle for obtaining redress for their grievances.
The Supreme Court's decision in Patterson serves these purposes
by limiting the number of theories available to a plaintiff and yet
cannot be construed as the taking away of any substantive right a
plaintiff may have.
The import of the recent Supreme Court decisions, as a prac-
tical matter, will be that bad cases will be less likely to go to trial.
Summary judgment may be granted more quickly under Wards
37. Id. at 2375.
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Cove and Lorence v. AT&T Technologies. Good cases, however,
will survive no matter what. I think that is borne out by the deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.3 8 In Price Waterhouse, the
plaintiff was a senior manager in the Price Waterhouse accounting
firm, one of the "big eight" accounting firms. She was proposed
for partnership at Price Waterhouse in 1982 along with 87 men. 37
of the candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were re-
jected, and 20, including Hopkins, were held for reconsideration
the following year.3 9 Many positive comments were made about
Hopkins during the partnership selection process, including com-
ments that she was "an outstanding professional" who had "a
strong character, independence and integrity." 40 She was popular
with clients, and good at attracting them. One client testified at
trial that she was "extremely confident, intelligent, strong and
forthright, very productive, energetic and creative." 41
Nevertheless, Hopkins apparently lackedi certain "interper-
sonal skills"42 in the office and had a difficult time dealing with
staff members. The partners' negative comments about Hopkins-
even those of partners supporting her-focused on her "interper-
sonal skills."43 In making these comments, however, there were
"clear signs" that some of the partners reacted negatively to Hop-
kins' strong and independent personality because she was a wo-
man.44 One partner described her as "macho." 45 Her file was
replete with comments regarding the fact that she was "a lady"
who had "masculine" characteristics. A male partner who ex-
plained to Ms. Hopkins the reasons for the decision to place her
candidacy on hold put the whole matter in perspective. He advised
Hopkins that to improve her chances for partnership she should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."46
At trial, a social psychologist testified that, based on these
and other reported remarks, the partnership selection process was
likely influenced by sex stereotyping. According to the Supreme
Court, "[iun the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer
who acts on the basis of the belief that a woman cannot be aggres-
38. 109 S. Ct. 1778.










sive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."47
Price Waterhouse is what is known as a "mixed motive" case.
In mixed motive cases, an employment decision is a result from "a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives." It is unlikely that
Ann Hopkins could have met the standard required in a disparate
treatment case. Under a disparate treatment case theory, plaintiff
must show that she was treated differently from others based
upon her status in a protected class.
The trial judge held Price Waterhouse legitimately empha-
sized interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, and he also
found that the firm had not fabricated its complaint about Hopkins
interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination.48 Price
Waterhouse also did not give decisive weight to such traits because
Hopkins was a woman. However, male candidates who lacked
these interpersonal skills were admitted to partnership, but these
males, the company claimed, possessed better positive traits that
Hopkins lacked.49 In addition, it is important to note that many of
the sex stereotypical comments made by evaluators were made by
Hopkins' supporters, not her detractors. Thus, those males mak-
ing sex stereotypical remarks were not acting with an intent to dis-
criminate, since they were advocating her admission to the
partnership. Thus, the court had to find that, unlike in a simple
disparate treatment case, this case involved a mixture of motives
and that at least one motive resulted in Hopkins not being granted
partnership.
The importance of the Price Waterhouse case is that a mixed
motive case is the only type of discrimination in which the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant. Perhaps this is demanded because
these are the most difficult types of cases for plaintiffs to prove.50
What the Court has done is develop a hybrid type of case-which
47. Id. at 1790-91.
48. Id. at 1783.
49. Id.
50. Under the disparate treatment theory, the burden of persuasion always re-
mains with the plaintiff. Under McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792,
802, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Bodine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981), the plaintiff must
show that they were a member of a protected class and were denied employment or
promotion. The defendant must then come forward with a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for the decision, which the platintiff may then attack as a pretext.
Although the defendant bears the burden of production of a legitimate non-discrim-
inatory reason, it does not ever bear the burden of proof in a disparate treatment
case. As discussed earlier with respect to the Wards Cove decision, the burden of
proof in a disparate impact case always remains with the plaintiff as well. Again,
the defendant in those cases is required to come up with a legitimate business justi-
fication to explain the apparent disparate impact, but at no point does the actual
burden of proof shift to the defendant.
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involves the actual shifting of the burden of proof to the defend-
ant. The plaintiff must show that a discriminatory reason was one
motive for the adverse personnel decision. The defendant is then
required to show that even if it had not taken gender or race into
account, it would have made the same decision. As the court
noted, it is important to shift the burden of proof to the defendant
in these cases because
if an employer allows gender to affect its decision-making pro-
cess, then it must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate
decision. We have not in the past required women whose gen-
der has proved relevant to an employment decision to establish
the negative proposition that they would not have been subject
to that decision had they been men, and we do not do so
today.5l
All of this brings me to my last and most important point. In
my view, the 1989 decision that will have the greatest impact on
the way employers deal with employees in the workforce is the
Price Waterhouse decision and its view of subjective decision-mak-
ing practices. I have heard some commentators argue that Price
Waterhouse is an anomaly because people simply do not "talk"
like that anymore when evaluating employees. Let me tell you
that those people are wrong. Subjective decision-making takes
place in the highest levels of an organization. In unskilled and low
level skilled work, objective decision making is much more com-
mon. You can count the number of items that someone makes or
the number of telephone calls an individual takes during a given
day and determine whether or not she is being productive. When
you get to a decision like partnership in an accounting firm, as in
Price Waterhouse, or a law firm, however, the decision-making
process is much more subjective and relies heavily on opinions
about employees' personalities.
In addition, at this level the decision-makers are managers
and supervisors who, although they may be extremely competent
in their own jobs, sometimes have very little time for listening to
"personnel" types who want to teach them how to do an evalua-
tion. It is sometimes easier, in my experience, to control the ac-
tions of first line supervisors by training and education, than it is
to control the behavior of executives who ought to know better.
Thus, the idea that Price Waterhouse is a decision of little signifi-
cance in actual terms, because "no one does those sorts of things
anymore" is a dangerous and naive point of view. Instead, Price
Waterhouse is likely one of the most significant decisions coming
out of the Supreme Court last term; it will have the greatest im-
51. Id. at 1789.
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pact on the way employers do business. Henceforth employers
will have to be very careful to couch their evaluations in sex neu-
tral terms, otherwise the plaintiff's bar will have a field day.
The other decisions will have an impact on the success rate of
discrimination actions, by making the plaintiff's job at trial harder,
and will limit plaintiffs' available remedies. But by and large, with
the exception of Price Waterhouse, these decisions will have little
effect on the way the defense is handled and, more importantly,
how employers treat their employees.
